HOWARD MARKS: COMO SOBREVIVER AO MAIOR EVENTO ECONÔMICO DO SÉCULO? | Market Makers #246

Good morning. It’s a pleasure to be here. It’s a pleasure to stay in this stage with two legends of the financial market. Uh Howard Marx is not only one of the greatest investor in the world but also a kind of philosopher. I read uh your two bestsellers, the most important thing in master the master cycle. I believe a lot of investors have read but also uh I read your memos not all the memos but I try to read uh every time and it’s amazing. I learned a lot about especially the concept of risk and how to use it in PRI and to exercise the the patience. One of the the greatest advice that I I learned with with Howard as a stock investor. I believe everybody has to be patient. I I know Howard is more a credit guy but uh we use a lot this. So thank you baby asset. Thank you gab to to invite me to stay here. But I’m not alone. Andra Shaki is not only one of the greatest traders in Brazil but also uh entrepreneur. He is the a of Pakar and J of JGP and if we are here in 2025 talking about financial market he’s one of the guys who helped us in the past to stay here. So, and he will help me with uh with the questions. It’s very, as I said in my podcast, it’s very good to be the dumbest guy in the room because one thing for sure, I will learn a lot today. So, can I start with the the first question? Sure. Go ahead. No, I just wanted to to say something. Thank you for coming here and I’m very proud to be on stage with you. And uh something that I wanted to mention is that when I read your letters, everything seems very simple and common sense, but common sense is something that is not very common. So congratulations. Thank you very much, Andre. Uh common sense is not common. And uh a friend of mine in England, Richard Oldfield, wrote a book about the investment business. Uh uh I love the title. simple but not easy. And I think that our task is simple. We have to position capital to benefit from future events but not easy. Uh mainly because uh we can’t know the future. One of my first question Howard is uh on April 4th right after the Trump’s liberation day um you said in an interview for Bloomberg that it was the biggest change of environment in your career almost four months later. How do you see the actor environment? Are we better or worse than that time? Well, the tariffs announced on April 2nd had the potential uh to upend the entire economic and political world by uh changing uh opinions regarding the United States and changing the way the world did business by uh reducing uh respect for the United States and its uh quality as a partner and by reducing the strong 10 trend toward globalization from which the world has benefited greatly uh over the last uh 50 60 years. Um the good news is that uh the administration is backing off on some of the tariffs. the uh deals that are being implemented are not uh uh as uh negative as the ones that were originally announced, but still we can’t know what lasting damage has been done uh to the uh the favorable trends that prevailed before the announcement. So um uh the potential uh to damage the environment, the investment environment is there uh and of course Brazil was seeing it firsthand. um and uh and feeling the the wrath of President Trump and seeing um how he responds to things that he thinks are significant. Um but we can’t be sure about the outcome and of course it is from our ability to our inability to know outcomes that the risk arises. Uh we’ll have to wait and see what happens. Andrea, do you want to second? Sure. Um well, following up on your statement, uh where are we now in the investment cycle and uh how should we approach uh the market? Should we be defensive? Should we be aggressive? I I I I appreciate your question very much because I think that you know investing has a variety of aspects. Um I mentioned the importance of positioning your capital for future events. We should all have a sense for what our normal correct portfolio should be. And that heavily means having a sense for what our normal balance of aggressiveness versus defensiveness should be. Each of you in the audience should consider your own uh position in life, your number of dependence, uh your level of wealth, your level of income, the sufficiency of your income and wealth, uh um your proximity to retirement, um your ability to rectify mistakes and your ability to live with volatility. in the market. All of these things should shape your normal balance of aggressiveness versus defensiveness. Now, h after you’ve done that, there are two possibilities. You can say, “I’m going to stay that way all the time. That’s right for me in the long run, and I’m not smart enough to change it.” Or you can say, I am going to change it in response to what’s going on in the market and I’m going to try to be more aggressive when the opportunities are better and more defensive when the dangers are higher. Both of those are valid uh uh choices. Um the first aspires to less and is uh more dependable. The second aspires to more and uh will produce more if done correctly but entails risks. Where are we today? That was your question. If you want to try to adjust your balance of aggressiveness to defensiveness in the short run, it should be in response primarily of to where the market stands in its cycle. As you asked, lots of people try to guess at what future events will be. And if you watch shows on TV or if you read uh the media, it’s they’re all talking about what’s going to happen in a year or in three years or in 10 years. And people adjust their portfolios in response to what they think will happen. The trouble is that we don’t know what the future brings and few people are better than anybody else at detecting it. I don’t believe we should adjust our portfolios in response to changes in what we think will happen. I think we should adjust it if we wish to and I believe in doing so in response to where we stand. Where do we stand? Is it time for more aggressiveness or more defensiveness? The times for more aggressiveness come when the news has been bad, prices have fallen, psychology is negative, people are pessimistic and unduly riskaverse. Ear of which means assets are cheap. When assets are cheap, prospective returns are high and risks are relatively low. This is not a description of the present time in the US and uh maybe not in Brazil. What has happened in the US is that we have had generally good news over the last several years in terms of the economy and we have had a period of 16 years since the market experienced any significant lasting weakness. These favorable developments have turned psychology favorable. Optimism has been successful and thus has been reinforced. Prices have risen causing people to feel good about what’s going on. Everybody has made money which has caused people to believe that risk-taking is rewarded and and loss need not be feared. The sum of these things in any market causes prices asset prices to be high in which case returns may may not be uh overwhelmingly good and risks may be significant. I think that the US market is not in a bubble. It’s not catastrophically high. But I do think that in the last two and a half years, the optimists have run the tugof war. They they have caused other people to emulate them. The sum of this has caused asset prices to be high relative to fundamentals which means that the balance in a portfolio should be towards safety not aggressiveness. Continue to talk about market cycle. There’s a growing belief that the traditional market and economy cycle may be broken or at least reshaped. How should investors think about long-term capital allocation? It it’s a good question, Diego. I think that when you talk about uh uncertainty or perhaps changes in how the markets and economy operate, I think we have to think about two things. Number one, the economic cycle in the short run was disrupted by the pandemic. In the pandemic, the the world did something it had never done before. The world voluntarily closed its economy in order to keep people at home and keep the disease from spreading. And according to our statisticians, it produced the most uh the biggest decline in GDP in history in the uh second quarter of 2020. However, the central banks and the treasuries of the world came to the rescue, cut interest rates, practiced quantitative easing or buying buying securities and thus putting money into the economy. And these tactics worked. They produced the biggest gain in history in the third quarter of 2020. And our economy and most of the world economies have grown ever since. So this may sound like uh statistical cribbling but the question arises how long has the current economic recovery been underway. We have recoveries in the economy and occasionally they’re interrupted by recessions. Did we have a recession? Was 2020 a recession? Andre says no. Thiago shakes his head. The point is that it’s a matter of semantics, but the thing that happened in 2020 was not a normal economic slowdown, which usually happens because expectations have been too positive and then are disappointed and behavior is crimped. We had a man-made business slowdown for noneconomic purposes. Was it a recession? Hard to say. If it was a recession in the second quarter of 2020, then the current recovery is 5 years old. Recoveries usually last 8 to 10 years. Things are good. If it wasn’t a recession, then the last recession, which ended in early ’09, is 16 years ago and we’re overdue for a recession. I can’t tell you which it is. Nobody can. There are reasons why economies should slow after all the things that have happened, but I don’t think they’re compelling reasons. And I don’t see vast excesses of of optimistic psychology in the economies. I don’t see vast overbuilding. I don’t see vastly excessive inventories or hiring. So uh I don’t I don’t think a recession is imminent. Um but no one can say the only thing we can say is that the historic reference to the cycle and its average duration is out the window. The other question surrounds central banks. It happens that the last two events that were significant in the in the world economies, the global financial crisis in ’08 and the pandemic in 20 were massive events, unusually significant. They were both met by quantitative easing, a newly developed tactic through which central banks buy bonds and put cash into the hands of the people they buy the bonds from, causing it to uh increase the liquidity in the economy. and QE and rate cuts have worked and basically have curtailed the recessions that might otherwise have occurred. So when we have a new technique and especially when we go for a long period without a recession, people start to say, “Oh, well maybe there’ll never be a recession again.” the the the economy has been reshaped by the central banks and u I don’t know about you fellows but I think that uh that uh ups and downs in the economies and the markets are the natural effect of uh fluctuations in human psychology and the central banks cannot illuminate them permanently. they can defer them. But if they defer a recession, for example, then maybe the recession that eventually happens will be greater than it otherwise would have been. So, you know, uh there’s an old saying, there’s nothing new under the sun. And I think that that the way op economies operate cannot be permanently changed but rather the impacts can be accelerated or delayed. Uh so I think we have to behave as usual and we have to again try to position our capital for future events and for the most part one of the key elements in doing so is diversification. So I think it’s, you know, if you say there’ll never be another recession, then the natural conclusion is, well, we should only own risky assets because they’ll they’ll do well in the perpetual prosperity. But since I don’t believe in perpetual prosperity, I think that’s wrong. And I think in essence we we concentrate our investments to take advantage of what we know but we diversify to protect against what we don’t know. And I think that diversification and a prudent balance in one’s portfolios are are still uh keys to in intelligent investing. Um let me follow up on that and given the environment of very small spreads now in the fixed income markets as you look around the world where do you see opportunities now? Um Andre’s uh reference to spreads for those who may not know uh he’s talking about the fact that most of us conclude that we can invest without credit risk in the treasury securities our of our respective countries. If we’re willing to take some credit risk or business risk, we can invest in corporate securities and target higher returns. The problem is that the existence of risk means those higher returns may not be realized and in fact they may disappoint us in terms of return or even lose money. So to take the risk of going from treasuries to corporate securities, investors should demand a risk spread, an increase in return to compensate for the increase in risk. As Andre says, spreads or what we traditionally called yield spreads or credit spreads have shrunk lately. Why have they shrunk? They’ve shrunk because people are optimistic and unworied and don’t see the need for uh risk compensation. They don’t see risk looming ahead. Um, of course, I believe that the riskiest thing in the world is the belief that there’s no risk. So I think that investors should always uh in insist on spreads, should always insist on the protection that spreads bring or the compensation for bearing risk that spreads bring. But in today’s relatively optimistic climate, as he says, spreads are narrow. Risk compensation is narrow. And so you know and and uh I believe that the situation is not dire is not terribly negative in this regard. I wrote a memo in March, I think it was, called Give Me Credit. And Thiago mentioned my memos. And I want to say that the memos are available to all of you at oaktree capital.com under the heading of insights. You can look at the last 35 years of memos if you have a quiet evening. Or you can subscribe to the future ones and uh the price is right. They’re free. uh and I hope you’ll read them. But anyway, give me credit from March is available on on the website. It talks about the adequacy of uh credit spreads and basically what it says is yes today’s spreads are narrow but historically the spreads have been much more than sufficient to offset credit risk and thus more than was required. And today in our market in particular uh credit quality has improved so risk compensation reasonably can uh be reduced. Having said that I do think that the narrow spreads are an important barometer of of psychology and they are reflecting uh optimistic psychology at this time. So you ask what else is there? Um first of all I think that um uh you know the I I let me say one thing. I usually get a question about what we call US exceptionalism. And US exceptionalism to me means the fact that basically since the end of World War II, the US has been the destination of choice for investors because of a combination of dynamic economy, respect for the free markets, respect for the rule of law, strong higher education, technological innovation, management skill, um strength and deep capital, capital markets. Um there are many reasons why uh investment has flowed to the US and the US has been overweighted in in uh international portfolios. Um and uh most of those reasons still remain in force although you can argue that recent events indicate some reduction of so-called US exceptionalism. But I think the US is still fundamentally speaking the best place in the world to invest. But it doesn’t come cheap. Most people have recognized that the US is the best place to invest and that’s largely what we call priced in. So when you invest in the US, you pay for this for the exceptional quality. What that means in answer to your question is that securities outside the US are often cheaper. You look at uh US you look at highear bonds which are the bonds of investments rated below uh of companies rated below investment grade at the present time uh European high yield bonds yield about 1% more than US high yield bonds why because the US is adored and Europe a little less so sometimes for good reasons but still cheaper So I would say in general that securities outside the US may be of lesser quality but probably are cheaper. that goes double for emerging markets uh which uh you know attitudes swing wildly with regard to uh emerging markets and in uh recent times they’ve been relatively negative although the emerging markets have done well this year largely with a recovery in China. Um lastly uh when you talk about uh where you can find bargains or relative bargains, I think the answer usually lies in doing the things other people don’t want to do. When you buy the things that everybody thinks are a great idea, they will have bit up the price and you’re unlikely to find the greatest bargains among the things that are most adored. In in my career, I’m sure like in yours, uh we’ve made a lot of money by doing the things other people don’t want to do. When when other people don’t want to do them, then the prices languish and there’s exceptional or there can be exceptional uh compensation, exceptional return potential and low risk. All of which comes from low prices which in turn come from a lack of investor affection. So in every market there are the things that are loved and the things that are rest loved and the the latter are likely to be the bargains. in private credit which is all the rage nowadays most of the money has flowed to what’s called direct lending for buyouts which I think is quite expensive today that market but other aspects of that market like assetbacked finance um and mezzanine finance have been relatively ignored and I think they’re considerably cheaper. So, it’s it’s it’s kind of a a a a willingness to uh do the things that others have uh turned against or overlooked that results in the location of bargains. Howard, I have a question right now. more. I put this question because we are in Brazil and would have soccer and you talked about this in one of the um actually is the the the most viewed video from Oak Tree’s YouTube channel. Howard is not only investor a writer but now uh YouTuber maybe but the video is how to think how to think about risk with Howard Marx. an excellent video and on that video you said that the right model for thinking about risk control isn’t just beyond football the your football but it’s beyond our football the Brazilian football soccer English football but Brazil is the king of this I would love to hear your explanation about this but before you you ask this question uh how familiar are you with other bowl. How familiar? Well, you know, when I was a boy, nobody played soccer in the United States. So, I grew up without it. I never played it. As a result, I never became a fan. Um, however, it it is it is growing in popularity now, especially since our our soccer tends to produce injuries among the people who play it and and and your football does so less. Uh the other thing of course is as people have moved to the United States more from Latin America and Europe uh again uh the cult of of uh of the beautiful game um has has increased in the United States. We now have professional soccer leagues. Uh I I was happily an investor in the first iteration of that the the LA Galaxy when it was started in the ‘9s. So I gained some familiarity mostly through the commercial side and most recently uh Oak Tree um made a loan to the to the owner of Inter Milan, one of the one of the uh stars of the uh uh European football world. Um which was not repaid. And so we we now own the collateral and we are the owners of uh with the we are the unintentional owners of of of a famous football team in Milan. But I think that I I I’m glad to have your question, Thiago, because I think that the distinction between US football and non- US football or Brazilian football as apply as as applied to risk is very significant. Uh raise your hands if you think you understand American football. All right, 30%. Okay, so here’s what happens in American football. One team sends out the offense, the other team sends out the defense. The offense has the ball. The offense has three tries or what we call downs to go 10 yards. If they move the ball 10 yards in in in four downs, they get another four downs to move it another 10 yards. And in this way they can progress down the field and eventually score. But if they can’t move the ball 10 yards in four tries or downs, then the referee blows the whistle. The ball goes over to the other team. The defense goes off the field and they send out the offense. The this team’s offense goes off the field and they send out the defense. And now that team tries to go 10 yards in that direction in four tries and this team tries to stop them. That has nothing to do with Brazilian football and nothing to do with investing. People think, and you can tell when you watch the TV shows, people think that you can send out the defense when it’s the when the time is right or send out the offense when the time is right. But the ability to do so, simple, right, but not easy. The ability to do so mostly doesn’t exist. There is no referee to blow the whistle and stop the play. There is no opportunity to send the defense off and the offense on the field or vice versa at the right time. There is very little ability to no way that’s right to do those things. There are very few substitutions in Brazilian football, very few stoppages and um you know basically for the most part the same 11 people have to play the whole game. Well, maybe one or two changes. That’s what investing is like. You put together a portfolio. You try to embody the correct balance of offense versus defense. You try to invest in things that will do well in a variety of circumstances because you don’t know exactly what the future is going to be like. And then you you count on that portfolio to to win the day. You shouldn’t expect to be able to change it in a timely fashion in uh to a great extent and you can adjust it from time to time, but for the most part, your portfolio has to provide protection against things going wrong and upside if things go right. At the same time, your players have to play offense and defense for you rather than you being able to put together exactly the right team for offense or defense at exactly the right time. So, I think that that investors shouldn’t expect to be playing American football. They should expect to have to respond to the requirements of Brazilian football. interesting. Now I get the the image of what you’re describing. Um, one of the things that I want to bring because I I also don’t believe in forecasting the future. I think uh all the time when I’m interviewed people ask me what is going to happen and obviously I say and I disappoint everybody because I don’t know. So uh but one of the things that intrigues me is that uh although we are not forecasters uh there is probably an element of forecasting when you decide to build a portfolio. How do you approach that? Well, Andre, this is a this is one of the great riddles of all time because uh obviously both of us and I think Thiago also are very limited in our opinions with regard to the ability to predict the macro future. Macro meaning economies, currencies, commodity prices, interest rates, the things that the things that dominate the whole economy. And yet, as he points out, we buy stocks and bonds and other assets based on our expectations for, among other things, company’s profits. You don’t buy a a share of stock in a company without having made an estimate of what its earnings will be. And you can’t make an estimate of what earnings will be if you don’t have some expectation with regard to what the economic setting will be like and what rates will be and and and and inflation and so forth. So um so and if you if you just think for one second about what I said investing is the act of positioning capital to take advantage of future events. So we can’t be completely uh agnostic with regard to the future. I think the key is people like us don’t make heroic forecasts of radical change. I think that’s the key. You know, uh the economy is limping along. Things haven’t been going great. There’s been a bit of a slowdown and uh and uh people have been laid off. businesses slow. The the the the modest humble I think natural assumption is that things will improve over time. Things will get back to normal. We’ll have something we call reversion to the mean. And you can normally expect reversion to the mean. and normal times relatively safety safely. What I don’t ever do is say, “No, no, things seem slow now, but in three years, we’re going to have a boom.” And that nobody expects that boom. Only I see it. And when the boom comes, it’s going to bring great news. Companies are going to make money like crazy, and the market’s going to triple because the boom is not uh counted in. Now, that is a heroic assumption. It’s idiosyncratic on my part. It would be enormously profitable if if it were true. It’s just that you can’t make heroic forecasts and expect to be right very often. So I think we I think I speaking for myself I think we base our forecast for companies on a normal economic environment. And in so doing, we kind of abstract from placing bets on radical changes in the macro environment. Rather, we drill down to understand better and hopefully better than anybody else the essence of our companies and what will uh uh cause them to sink or swim. still talking about this. Uh, how can investors avoid short-term distractions and stay focused on long-term strategy? What mindset or process help you stay grounded? Well, you know, I when we were talking before we started, I mentioned my friend’s book, Simple But Not Easy. Um, when I hear questions like Thiago’s which start with the word how can we, those are the hard ones. I can tell you what to do. I can tell you the simple things that investing consists of. I just can’t tell you how to do them. How to do them requires education, experience, and insight. And I can’t, nobody can deliver those things to you. So you have to either accept that you’re limited in those regards and thus make only modest decisions or you have to turn the task of managing money over to people who do possess those things. But um you know it it’s very different. As Thiago says, one of the absolutely most important things is to have patience and to have your emotions under control in the short run. Think about it. Things go well. The economy is performing well. Companies are acting well. They’re reporting rising profits. stocks are rising, markets are doing well, and everybody’s making money. These are the conditions that cause stocks to rise, but and and but they’re also the conditions that cause people to buy more and more and more and more and to get more and more excited as prices go higher and bargains become inferior until they spend all their money at the top. Eventually things stop going quite so well. The economy slows down. The companies perform less good. Their earnings are less positive and maybe even negative. The prices decline. Psychology turns negative. These are the things that cause prices to decline and they are the things that cause people to turn pessimistic until they get so depressed that they sell. And as prices go down, they sell more because they feel bad and more and more bad until they’ve sold everything at the bottom. Now my mother told me Howie, buy low, sell high. Everything in human nature conspires to get us to buy high and sell low. And so we must fight it. We must not succumb to emotion. We must not get more and more excited as things go higher and more and more depressed as things go lower. Just think, you walk into a store and there’s a price tag on something $100. Hey, I So, you’re standing there, you’re thinking about whether to buy it. The manager comes out, he puts up a sign, sale 20% off. Now, it’s $80. Do you get depressed? No. You say, “Now’s the time.” But only in the in the securities markets do people get depressed when merchandise goes on sale. You have to resist these negative emotions. You have to resist getting excited when things go well and depressed go badly. Now you can try to be immune to those emotions and that will improve your investment results. Ultimately you can try to do the opposite. to be what’s called a contrarian and to get excited when things go down in price and buy and cautious when things rise in price and sell. And if you can time that well, simple but not easy, you’ll have the best investment results, but you shouldn’t expect to be able to do it very often or to do it correctly. So I think in answer to your question, having emotional stability and patience and a long-term focus and a tendency to inaction will produce better results for most investors. Uh I just can’t tell you how to achieve it. But but I I think that I I’d love if everybody in the audience today devoted particular attention to trying to achieve that state. I’m going to ask you a personal question because I think uh in my life luck has uh been extremely important uh be it in my personal life or in my professional life and I know you also mentioned uh more than once that luck is is extremely important in your life. Could you describe uh what happened and how it worked? Well, I’m really glad to hear you say that, Andre, because I find that people who are successful but deny that luck played a part in it, I think those people are insufferable, and I don’t like to be around them. uh you know uh I wrote a memo on this topic in January of 14 called Getting Lucky and it it was the most read memo of all until 2021 when I wrote about my experience during the pandemic living with my son and his family which overtook it. But basically I say that I think luck is important. I think the idea that that luck plays no part should be rejected. I think that the idea that part of our success is attributable to luck should not be resisted. It shouldn’t depress us. It should make us happy and we should acknowledge it and accept it and share our good fortune with others. So, I put out this memo uh in called Getting Lucky January of 14. And I say in there that I I think luck is very important. I think I’ve been l one of the luckiest people on earth. And and uh and and that keeps my attitude positive and and maybe like the happy idiot, I go around expecting to continue to be lucky. Um anyway, you know, I had great good fortune a couple of times in my life. Uh back in 1969 when I was getting out of graduate school, I applied for a number of jobs. Uh the one I thought was the most prestigious and glamorous is the one I didn’t get. And 30 years later, I had opportunity to speak with the recruiter from that firm and and and he said, “Oh, the answer is simple. We hired the wrong guy.” I said, “Well, you’re sweet to say that.” He said, “No, no, I don’t mean it like that. I mean that the recruiters all voted to hire you and the partner in charge came in that morning and gave the job to the wrong person. He actually called my apartment and gave the job to my roommate. And if it wasn’t for that little bit of bad luck, I could have spent my first 40 years at Lehman Brothers and ended up with nothing to show for it when it went bankrupt. So that was really good luck that the partner called the wrong person, wasn’t it? Likewise, when I started work, the bank practiced something called nifty50 investing. They bought the stocks of the 50 best and fastest growing companies in America. Companies that were so good that number one, nothing bad could ever happen, and number two, there was no price too high for those stocks. If you bought those stocks the day I got to work in September 1969, and if you held them tenaciously and loyally and faithfully for five years, you lost 95% of your money. And since I was part of that activity, by 1975, at the tender age of 29, I had become City Bank’s director of research. Since I was part of it, I was banished to the bond department, which was the equivalent of Siberia. And I got there in May of 1978, just in time to get a phone call from the head of the bond department saying that there’s a guy named Milin or something in California who deals with something called high yield bonds. Do you think you could figure out what that means? And I said, “Yes.” And in exile, I got an opportunity to make one of the greatest decisions that held me in goodstead for the next 47 years till today. High yield bonds became one of the main stays of the investment world. And like I said earlier, the greatest thing is to do the things nobody else will do. Other people wouldn’t buy them. They said they’re junk bonds. They’re low quality. That’s why they yield so much. And of course, one of the reasons they yielded so much is that other people wouldn’t buy them and they languish cheap with wide spreads. So it was luck. Now they say luck uh is what happens when preparation meets opportunity. You have to be prepared. You have to be open-minded. You have to work hard. But the the ultimate ingredient is luck. and I’ve had it and I look forward to more and I wish it for all of you. Thank you, Howard. Our time is over. We have a lot of questions to do, but I finalized asking you to give a message to all Brazilian investors and what’s the most important thing right now for you as an investor looking for the market? Well, the most important thing and it’s not right now. It the most important thing all the time is to invest. Invest early. Invest as much as you can. Invest steadily in something that you can own for a long time. Don’t expect to shoot the lights out and get your decisions precisely right, but invest in things that will will last. Don’t try to get it perfect. Try to do it well. And uh and and as as Thiago’s question implied before, don’t let human nature get you to do the wrong thing. Don’t let human nature get you to not buy when things are down or to buy when things are up or to sell uh just because you get a little worried and experience some some fluctuations. investing in the long run. You harness the power of economic growth and corporate performance and it will perform for you in the long run if you let it. Uh the US remains the best single place in the world to invest for most people. Brazil has as always great potential and and someday will harness all of that potential and excel in the world. And the point is this is this is a railroad investing the US, Brazil and other countries are are a railroad and you want to get on and stay on and uh the road will have bumps but in the long run you’ll come out way ahead. So thank you for having me here today. Thank you uh to uh Bank of Brazil for inviting me. Thank you to Andre and Thiago for speaking with me and uh I look forward to uh the future with you.